
CULTURE, VALUES AND NIGERIA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: ENGAGING AFFECTIVE LOGIC AS A METHODOLOGICAL MODEL IN A POST-TRUTH ERA

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Abstract

Several reasons have been given for the lack of development in Nigeria specifically and in Africa generally. Many measures have also been suggested as ways of tackling the problem. While some see the solution to the problem to be political, others see it to be scientific and technological. For some, the solution to Nigeria's problems is economic in nature while for others it is ethical. This paper holds that the nature of logic embedded in a people's culture, has the capacity of aiding their development. This position is strengthened by the fact that there is no society without a culture and the existence of culture, presupposes the existence of its system of understanding reality, knowledge and values. Since culture is dynamic, our present day developmental challenges can be met when those positive values that formed the bedrock of the traditional African societies are transvalued or revalued and made useful in the strive for Nigeria's political development.

Keywords: Affective, Culture, Logic, Post-truth, Political development, Transvaluation

Introduction

It is necessary to begin the discourse on the relevance of traditional culture and values to Nigeria's political development with a shared understanding of the meaning of the 'post-truth era'. The concept of 'post-truth' has its roots in American politics. In 2016, the Oxford Dictionary named it their newest and most used expression, defining it as "a term relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief"¹. It is reported that in 2016, during the American presidential election, fact-checking platforms in the course of their checks counted

¹"Oxford Word of the Year 2016". Retrieved from [languages.oup.com](https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/2016). Date accessed: December 12, 2019.

up to 217 untruths in the candidates' speeches and statements². Nigeria may not yet have the sophistication of facts-checking platforms dedicated to ascertaining the number of untruths, half-truths and deliberate falsehoods in statements made by public-office seekers at political campaigns. However, one cannot deny the fact that the tool of the internet and especially the new media has had a dramatic effect in influencing political activities in Nigeria both positively and negatively. The reach and ease of spreading political propaganda in today's world is unprecedented.

The idea of a post-truth era becomes important for us because philosophers have always been concerned about truth. Hannah Arendt³ has asserted that the term 'post-truth' contains the concept 'truth' which is a familiar philosophical concern. What this implies is that the understanding of the 'post-truth' phenomenon is dependent on our understanding of the period when truth was perceived as important and relevant, and during which public opinion was influenced more by objective facts than appeals to personal beliefs and sentiments as we have today. Yael Brahm's⁴ holds that the post-truth phenomenon is linked to postmodernism which is characterized by the rejection of a single objective truth in favor of a multitude of subjective and relative truths. The post-truth era is marked by the emergence of new information channels like personal blogs, YouTube, instant messaging channels, such as WhatsApp, Telegram and Facebook Messenger and social media networks like Snapchat or Twitter. A simple tweet can mobilize the masses either for a good cause or a bad one, regardless of its truthfulness. The post-truth phenomenon plays out in the growing use of the social media for information dissemination by political actors. Such information is often marked by selective vision as truth and objective facts are sacrificed for political utility and instrumentality. Any contemporary approach to political development must take the rate at which political propaganda get circulated at breakneck speed today into consideration, as this can influence political development negatively. What we intend to do in this work is to explore how African traditional and cultural values can be useful for Nigeria's political development in the present era which has been characterized as 'post-truth'. In doing this, we shall make use of the method of affective logic proposed by a Nigerian philosopher, Udo Etuk. We begin by looking into different perspectives on Nigeria's development as defended by some thinkers.

²Jose Zarzalegos "Communication, Journalism and Fact Checking". *The Post-Truth Era: Reality versus Perception*. Vol. 27, (2017): 11.

³Hannah Arendt, "Understanding and Politics." *Partisan Review* 20, No. 4, (1953): 377

⁴Yael Brahm's "Philosophy of Post-Truth". Retrieved from www.inss.org.il. Date accessed: December 12, 2019.

Different Perspectives on the Question of Nigeria's Development

One of the issues that never fail to crop up in any discourse that centers on Nigeria is the question of her development. This question arises because Nigeria is so endowed with human and natural resources, enough to make her the envy of other countries of the world; yet, in actual fact, she remains at the brink of poverty, want and squalor. Apart from the failure of development, inter-tribal wars, ethnic conflicts and armed hostilities further compound the situation. It is suspected that at every point in time there are always some major ethnic conflicts brewing up somewhere in the country. In recent times, insecurity, kidnapping, hostage taking and terrorism have assumed an alarming status, with the multiplicity of ethnic militias and terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen. This state of affair questions the meaning of time-tested African values, like the high regard for human life, deep sense of morality and synergetic existence.

Many African scholars have gone into dialogue and have made their insights known on what they see to be responsible for the lack of meaningful development in Nigeria and in Africa generally. Chinua Achebe⁵ is quite explicit when he states that the trouble with Nigeria is her leadership. This leaves us with the understanding that the problem of lack of meaningful development can be traced to the political class. Of course, they have a wider sphere with which they can influence the lot of those they lead positively and significantly. For Chukwudum Okolo⁶, what is responsible for the African condition is 'the squandermania mentality' - a consumer consciousness which makes the African to be more acquisitive and less-productive. This, without doubt, is an approach that is tied to the workings of the economy as an explanation for the lack of progress in African nation-states. Joseph Omoregbe⁷ holds that it is immorality that is the greatest and most formidable obstacle to Nigeria's development. That is an understanding from the perspective of ethics which ties the unhealthy developmental condition of Nigeria to her lack of moral health. For Innocent Asouzu⁸, the root cause of the problem is the inability of the contemporary African to manage the ambivalence of his situation well. Hence, he recommends a complementary attitudinal change – a process which individuals and societies seek to reposition their minds in a way that makes it possible for them to always anchor their interests on the dictates of the common good as a solution to the developmental problems facing the African. Thus, for Asouzu, the problem is

⁵Chinua Achebe. *The Trouble with Nigeria*. (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Press, 1983), 1.

⁶Chukwudum Okolo. *Squandermania Mentality: Reflections on Nigerian Culture*. (Nsukka: University Publishers, 1994), 9.

⁷Joseph Omoregbe. *Ethics: A Systematic and Historical Study*. (Lagos: Joja, 1993), 148.

⁸Innocent Asouzu. *The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy*. (Calabar: University of Calabar Press, 2004), 232

that individual interests have been misplaced and mistaken for the common good. The way out for him is a reordering of our priorities in line with the dictates of the common good. Asouzu's approach seems quite insightful, considering very recent happenings in our political space. Whenever the general elections are round the corner, we witness a gale of defections and cross-carpeting among our political class. While some claim that their defections are anchored on the common good of their constituents, others have been quick to point out that the real interests behind such defections are more personal than common. For while some defect in order to have a platform that can make them seek personal political ambitions that were threatened by the previous platform, others simply defect in order to be shielded from prosecution for financial crimes.

This paper does not seek to disprove any of the explanations offered by these eminent scholars and philosophers as causes of and solutions to Nigeria's problems and suggestions for her development. As far as the arguments go, these positions all have their merits and can be rigorously defended with facts and examples. This paper holds that these explanations and even more can be offered as reasons for Nigeria's backwardness, depending on one's point of view. Development is multi-dimensional and that is why we can talk about scientific development, political development, economic development, educational development, and so on. Genuine development is fundamentally of human beings in terms of ideas which imbue in them the capacity to think qualitatively and tackle the problems that emerge out of their living conditions. Viewed from an all-inclusive perspective, development is a syndrome of a people's all-round welfare, encompassing their economic, social, political and technological needs. No nation can claim to be developed as long as there are vast areas of neglect, poverty, squalor and inhuman habitations punctuated by islands of affluence. Some of the major indices of political development, like free and fair periodically held elections, peaceful transition in governance, respect for the rule of law, guaranteeing of human rights, freedoms and liberties, moral probity, accountability and transparency, independence and viability of political institutions, and so on, are still lacking in Nigeria today. At this point, it is necessary to look closely into traditional African culture and explore values that can be useful for political development.

On Traditional African Culture and Values

As a word, 'culture' has been variously defined. One of its earliest definitions is one given by the anthropologist, Edward Taylor, who defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs or any

other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”⁹. What this means is that owing to the social nature of man, he is inescapably a product of the culture and traditions of the society into which he is born. The cultural life-ways, values, myths, religious systems and other things he inherits, which are peculiar to his society, were handed down to him by his forebears, and he owes the obligation of handing them down to succeeding generations.

The definition of culture can be seen to include both the tangible and intangible, the material and the non-material, the concrete and the abstract and, in fact, everything that is peculiar to a social group. This is why culture includes language, music, dances, laws, stories, courtesy and etiquette. It includes our modes of dressing, the kind of clothes we wear, the food we eat, the house we live in, the furniture in our home and even our tools of work, farming, war, crafts, artifacts, automobiles, computers, televisions, spaceships, and so on. The pervasive nature of the concept of culture makes it that anyone who attempts to define it, bears the burden of defining it to capture the total way of life of a social group.

There are some people who view culture negatively, completely ignoring its positive dimensions and creative usage. To such persons, whenever the word is mentioned, they raise their eyebrows and frown at the word, as they in their mind’s eyes visualize masquerades, idol worshipping, traditional jamborees and other activities they consider bizarre that go with culture. This pejorative usage and understanding is increased when we talk about ‘traditional African culture’. Here, it appears that the three words that make up the phrase are all negative to such people. Since philosophers never rest content in their penchant for conceptual analysis, it is necessary for us to inquire into the true meanings of these concepts.

Culture can be seen to be ‘traditional’ in the sense that it has to do with those things that have been handed down to one from his forebears in the course of time. This meaning and usage of the word must be delineated from the evaluative usage which sees the ‘the traditional’ to be responsible for lack of growth and development. In this sense, ‘the traditional’ is often seen as something unprogressive, backward and anachronistic. It is used to describe things that are primitive, superstitious and mythical. In some circles, ‘the traditional’ is used in opposition to the modern, the developed and the more recent and advanced. The position of this paper is that ‘the traditional’ should not be seen as that which is responsible for the failure of development in African societies. In fact, ‘the traditional’, in the sense of values handed down from the pristine African societies, can form the foundation of development. To say that an institution or practice is

⁹Edward Taylor. *Primitive Culture*. (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1958), 1.

traditional is not the same as saying that it is bad, just as ‘the modern’ cannot in all cases be equated with ‘the good’.

Another question that can be raised is whether there is any such thing as ‘the African culture’ as distinct from the cultures of the various ethnic and tribal entities that make up Africa. To this question, the clear and straight-forward answer is that there is no one culture that can be seen as ‘the African culture’, owing to the fact that there are many cultural entities that make up Africa. How then can we meaningfully talk about ‘African culture’?

The concept of ‘African culture’ derives its legitimacy from the fact that there is an underlying similarity among the cultures of Africa that vanishes when we compare a culture in Africa with, say, a non-African culture like the Western or Eastern cultures. This is why Udo Etuk holds the opinion that, “it would be altogether misleading to give the impression that there is one thing that can be called ‘the African culture’. The diversity of cultural practices in Africa is recognized even by the most casual observer. This, notwithstanding, it appears that there are a number of values held in common by many ethnic groups in Africa that might be said to subtend and inform the basic norms of the societies”¹⁰.

Since culture is what defines a social group and gives it a unique identity, it cannot be denied that values that a people hold on to are also an aspect of their culture. Culture itself is dynamic in the sense that it does not only stick on to those aspects of tradition that enhance human life, but it is also open to innovations that make human life more meaningful. This is why Moses Makinde¹¹ holds that culture is not static but evolutionary. In this sense, whatever values a society holds is derived from its culture, though culture itself is not exhausted in our conception of values. This is because culture has a wider scope, embracing a whole lot of things that we cannot consider to be ‘values’ in the strict sense of the word. An explication of what we mean by values is necessary at this point.

Values are simply the things that individuals or a society cherishes deeply. In ordinary parlance, it is the ‘price-tag’ that we place on something. Values are very close to the hearts and affections of so many people and that is why we see people trying to live by them and would possibly even die for them because there are some values without which human life and existence would be greatly impoverished. It appears that this is the understanding behind Andrew Uduigwomen’s remark that “social life is impossible without a system of values. The question of value revolves around what a person or society conceives as being

¹⁰Udo Etuk. *The Riches of Philosophy*. (Uyo: Scholars Press, 2000), 163

¹¹Moses Makinde. *African Philosophy: The Demise of a Controversy*. (Ile-Ife: OAU Press, 2010),

good, valuable, desirable and preferable”¹². Freedom is a value; and so are others like sincerity, beauty, friendship, truth, honesty and love. Values can be seen as those goals which form the rationale behind human actions in their day-to-day interactions as social beings. It is in the light of this that we can meaningfully talk about educational values, social values, political values, business values, family values, religious values and even personal values.

More often than not, we see that individual values are weaved into a larger system of values that guides the actions, beliefs and practices of a cultural entity. This is because values do not exist in isolation. Values form a syndrome of calculated and carefully balanced ethos which represent a value system. The concept of value system is very appropriate, because as in any other system, the units which are the values themselves are so interrelated that they form an integral and organic whole. Values are atemporal in the sense that they cannot be ‘modernized’. In this sense, when we talk about ‘modern values’, it should not carry the same positive emotional appeal such as ‘modern technology’ might carry. Etuk opines that “values held dear by people in traditional societies, such as kinship ties, co-operative existence and group solidarity are valid for all times. In that sense, values are atemporal. This posture is defensible when it is borne in our mind that our so-called ‘modern society’ is forever hankering after those values and virtues that made the traditional societies rich, even though they might have been materially poor by today’s standards”¹³.

Since we cannot talk about the ‘modernization’ of values in the sense of making the time-tested values of the indigenous African societies to form the foundation for African development, we can therefore talk about their trans-valuation as a way of revaluating and adopting the positive dimensions of our cultural values in the strive for Nigeria’s political development. Although Kwame Gyekye¹⁴ does not make use of the concept of trans-valuation, he is expressing the same idea when he states that the main reason why he focuses on cultural values is that he considers most of them, when the appropriate and necessary amendments and refinements have been made, to be relevant to African modernity; that is, to the cultural life of the African people in the modern world. Gyekye is talking about ‘necessary amendments and refinements’, because just as there are positive features of African culture, it also has its negative features; just as the modern society and its culture too also has both positive and negative dimensions. In this regard, Gyekye further remarks that there is need for a society to commit itself unreservedly

¹²Andrew Uduigwomen. *A Companion of Christian Philosophy and Apologetics*. (Calabar: Ultimate, 2009), 32

¹³Udo Etuk. *The Riches of Philosophy*. Op. cit., 162

¹⁴Kwame Gyekye. *African Cultural Values*. (Accra: Sankofa, 1996), 171

in making such necessary changes in its values, practices and institutions inherited from the past as to make them really worthwhile and functional in the contemporary world.

We cannot conclude this section without having an overview of some of the positive traditional African cultural values, as this is the foundation upon which we intend to stand and look into the challenge of Nigeria's political development. Let us begin with communalism in the indigenous African society. Communalism is the strong kinship relationship which binds people together, giving them a sort of synergetic life and existence. For Gyekye, "the value that traditional African societies place on communalism is expressed in the sharing of common social life, commitment to the social or common good of the community, appreciation of mutual obligations, caring for others, mutual interdependence and solidarity. Communal life is held as natural to the human being".¹⁵ For example, if a young man needed to build a house, his age grade would join hands and build the house for him, each person working willingly, happily and giving his best. The joy of cooperation, value for team-spirit and love for the other person fostered a society of care and fellow-feeling. The traditional method of savings, called 'contribution' (*osusu*), made it such that, the contribution was moved around according to whoever had a more pressing need. Instead of money yielding a huge interest to an individual in a bank, it was helping someone in need. This practice is widespread in Africa and it is in tandem with the African communal value. The Ibibios call it '*osusu*'; the Igbos call it '*isusu*'; the Yorubas call it '*esusu*', while the Akans of Ghana call it '*susu*'.

In the African system of value, morality had a pride of place, as any conduct that failed to square with socially accepted moral standards was met with stern sanctions. Love and respect for family name and prestige built in the needed moral basis upon which the society flourished. Immoral behaviour was sanctioned because of the belief that an immoral conduct by an individual member of the society could attract punishment, pestilence or plagues from the gods on the whole society. The society had to punish the offender in order to avert a general punishment of the entire society by the deities, spirits, divinities or ancestors. Whether the gods actually punished the societies or not is controversial but what cannot be denied is that this belief had a way of building a morally strong society where crimes were little or unheard of.

There was also a very deep value and respect for nature, and this contributed to the balancing of the ecosystem through the use of prohibitions and sanctions, some of which the penalty for their violation could be extreme. There were

¹⁵*Ibid*; p. 175

prohibitions from farming and collecting firewood from certain regions or even fetching water from certain streams at certain times. Trees could not be felled at random and there was an attitude of ‘cooperating with nature’ as opposed to the ‘conquering of nature’ which Western technological culture revels on. From here we can understand the source of many grudges in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria where there are conflicts between host communities from where oil is explored and the multi-national companies who explore for oil without care for the environment. These conflicts serve to show that there is a collision of value systems, cultures, beliefs, practices and even ontological and metaphysical outlooks. The environmental degradation, destruction of terrestrial and aquatic life caused by oil spillage and gas flaring are absurd to the traditional African who believes in ‘cooperating with nature’.

If we look at the dimension of aesthetics, traditional Africans have a robust sense of beauty and its appreciation. Uduigwomen¹⁶ has argued that in African sense of aesthetics, the traditional African mindset holds that the beautiful must be imbued with morality. Gyekye points out that in the traditional African culture, beauty is not only seen in works of art and in the human figure but also in human conduct, in humanity itself and in a person’s character. Whether we are dealing with the strong kinship relationship in traditional African societies, or the strong sense of morality which gave individuals the courage to face extreme punishments for the sake of the common good and so on, the singular thread that runs across these instances is that they are based on desirable values. Let us now have an overview of the methodology of affective logic before drawing out its implications for Nigeria’s political development.

An Overview of the Methodology of Affective Logic

Logic as a major branch of philosophy has been variously defined. Bangs Tapscott defines it as “the science of evaluating human reasoning”¹⁷, while Patrick Hurley sees it as “an organized body of knowledge or science that evaluates arguments”¹⁸. These definitions will form the background to the operational definition that will be given to affective logic subsequently. Traditionally, there is a distinction between formal and informal logic; formal logic deals with the structure of reasoning as what determines the validity of arguments, while informal logic is more concerned with the identification of fallacies that arise in the use of natural language. Peter King and Stewart Shapiro assert that “Aristotle was the first thinker

¹⁶Andrew Uduigwomen. “Obscenity as an Aesthetic Category in African Art: Questioning its Value” *African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society*.1.2, 2008, 80.

¹⁷Bangs Tapscott *Elementary Applied Symbolic Logic*. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), 1

¹⁸Patrick Hurley. *A Concise Introduction to Logic*. (Belmont: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2008), 1.

to devise a logical system”¹⁹. The model of logic developed by Aristotle was considered to be perfect, and even Immanuel Kant remarked that logic as it came from the hands of Aristotle was a “closed and completed body of doctrine”²⁰. Kant was later proved wrong with the development of alternative systems of logic that go beyond the bivalent tradition like the various many-valued systems of logic. Even within the bivalent tradition, propositional and predicate logics overstepped the boundaries of Aristotelian logic, thereby rendering its absolutistic conception untenable. With these developments, thinkers like Jan Lukasiewicz, Alonzo Church, Nicholas Rescher, Chris Ijiomah, Jonathan Chimakonam, Udo Etuk and so on have supported the idea that logic is relative, not absolutist in nature. The idea that logic is relative is not antithetical to its universality. Universality is itself a quality of systems of logic which define the scope or reach of their usefulness. Different systems of logic enjoy varying degrees of universality, but the bivalent system inaugurated by Aristotle’s syllogism and sustained by modern mathematical logic is the most universal system. However, this bivalent system is not absolute as it has been seen to be inadequate in specific contexts such as future contingency²¹, quantum reasoning²² and African conception of reality²³. There have been many thinkers who deny the existence of logic in African culture. Christian Greiffenhagen and Wes Sharrock, for instance, maintain that if there are moments when the law of excluded middle is not adhered to in a culture, such a situation suggests two possibilities: first is that such a culture falls short of the universal standard of rationality while the second is that the culture is nonetheless rational, but the laws of classical logic are not a universal standard of rationality²⁴. While

¹⁹Peter King and Stewart Shapiro. “The History of Logic”. *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 496.

²⁰Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. (London: Macmillan, 1964), 17.

²¹Jan Lukasiewicz. “On Three-valued Logic”. *Polish Logic: 1920-1939*. (Oxford: O.U.P, 1967), 16-18.

²²Dalla Chiara, Roberto Guintini and Milkos Redei. “The History of Quantum Logic”. *Handbook of the History of Logic*. Vol. 8. (Elsevier B.V., 2007), 205-284.

²³Udo Etuk’s idea of African logic is in line with this and there are many works on this by thinkers like Victor Ocaya, Chris Ijiomah, Meinrad Hebgga and so on, but Jonathan Chimakonam has so far been one of the most consistent. His recent works in this direction are: Jonathan Chimakonam. *Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies*. Springer, 2019; Jonathan Chimakonam. “The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm”. *Philosophical Perceptions of Logic and Order*. Edited by, Jeremy Horne. IGI Global, 2018, 96-121; Jonathan Chimakonam. “The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics”. *The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy*. Edited by, Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 105-128.

²⁴Christian Greiffenhagen and Wes Sharrock. “Logical Relativism, Grammar and Arithmetic in Cultural Comparison”. *Configurations*. Vol. 14 No.3, (2006), 275.

Lucien Levy Bruhl²⁵, for instance, adopts the first possibility and applies such epithets as ‘pre-logical’, ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ to the African and his worldview, this paper adopts the second possibility which is in line with the idea of the relativity of systems of logic.

For persons’ familiar with the history of African philosophy, it would be readily admitted that the debate over its existence and nature was quite an engaging one. With universalists denying the existence of African philosophy on grounds that if it must be philosophy, then it must connect with the universal idea of philosophy, the onus was on traditionalists who claimed that there is philosophy in African culture to prove it. A truce was reached in the idea that, even if African philosophy did not exist, the debate over its existence somehow created it. Though this truce aborted the debate from reaching a logical conclusion, the concession on the part of the universalists heralded the beginning of creative work in the field of African philosophy. It is from this background of the success story of African philosophy that Udo Etuk raises the question of the existence, nature and the possibility of African logic.

Ordinarily, one would have thought that since logic is the tool of philosophy, one’s admittance of the existence of African philosophy should directly imply an admittance of the existence or at least the possibility of African logic. This line of reasoning appears to follow naturally and deductively. However, there are African philosophers who maintain that there is logic in African philosophy, no doubt, but that there is no such thing as African logic. They hold the view that logic is universal and can be applied to, but cannot be tied to, the particularities of culture. Ademola Fayemi, for instance, states that he is in agreement with Moses Makinde and Odera Oruka who believe that African logical thinking can be systematized; however, that such systematization must be in line with formal logic as is known in Western philosophy. The implication of this for him is that there is logic in Africa, but there is no such thing as African logic²⁶. By ‘logic in Africa’, Fayemi is talking about the replication of an absolute logic that, he believes, can be found in every thought system. With this characterization, one is not left in doubt about the fact that he is referring to Aristotelian (bivalent) logic.

On the other hand, by ‘African logic’, Fayemi is referring to a peculiarly African logic and, in this regards, he passes the judgment that there is no such thing. Fayemi has noted that Western thinkers, such as Levy-Bruhl, have claimed that traditional Africans were pre-logical, magical and primitive in their cultural mode of living. He has also stated that the specific reason for drawing this conclusion is

²⁵Lucien Levy-Bruhl. *Primitive Mentality*. (George Allen and Unwin, 1923), 21.

²⁶Ademola Fayemi. “The Logic in Yoruba Proverbs”. *Itupale Online Journal of African Studies*. Vol. 2, (2010), 3.

that Aristotle's laws of thought do not appear to be observed at all times in African thought. However, Fayemi says that "the Aristotelian law of excluded middle is not applicable to every event in Africa"²⁷. This is self-contradicting. If a law that is considered to have an axiomatic status in a system of logic is not adhered to in a cultural context, this surely makes it imperative for an alternative system of logic to be developed with which such a context can be understood and reasoned about. Uduma Uduma as well holds the opinion that logic is universal and, as such, it is a misnomer to talk of African logic. However, in the same essay, he later maintains that "Africans accept that contradiction does not have the meaning of absurdity" and that "Africans are more inclined to the dialectical conception of logic where everything is mediated and therefore, everything is itself and at the same time not itself"²⁸. Even if it is admitted that Africans are 'more inclined' to a dialectical conception of logic and hence 'less inclined' to a non-dialectical or bivalent conception of logic, this still supports the conclusion that a bivalent conception of logic is not absolute. Different systems of logic enjoy different degrees of universality; there is no system of logic that is absolute in the sense that it is without contextual limitations. In this sense, Udo Etuk's idea of affective logic can be seen as an alternative system of logic in the context of African culture. Though philosophy can serve as judge of what is rational and valuable in culture, it can also be rooted in culture and there is a strong case for the claim that culture provides and imposes the discourse in which philosophical enquiry is pursued.

Bruce Janz has noted that "African philosophy requires the resources of culture itself (traditional and otherwise) in order for it to be 'African' philosophy. Even something as abstract as logic may be rooted in culture and yet nevertheless, have philosophical implications"²⁹. Joseph Omoregbe has also supported this idea when he asserts that "it is false to say that people cannot think logically or reason coherently unless they employ Aristotle's or Russell's forms of logic or even western-type argumentation"³⁰. 'Affective' is an adjective that qualifies the sort of logic that Etuk believes can be found in African culture. As a word, it has the dictionary meaning of being used in describing a situation of being characterized by emotion. Emotion itself is a value-neutral concept, as it can be characterized as

²⁷*Ibid*, 5.

²⁸Uduma Uduma. "Can There be an African Logic?" *From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy*. Edited by. A. F. Uduigwomen. (Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers, 2009), 289.

²⁹Bruce Janz. "African Philosophy". Retrieved from www.pegasus.cc.ucf.edu on August 20, 2016, 15.

³⁰Joseph Omoregbe. "African Philosophy: Yesterday and Today". *Philosophy in Africa: Trends and Perspectives*. Edited by, P. O. Bodunrin. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985, 4-5.

positive or negative. Sincerity, fidelity, trustworthiness and so on are values that elicit positive emotions when they are possessed. Deceitfulness, lies and the uncritical spread of political propaganda are negative emotions and vices that are not in tandem with the traditional African culture. In this sense, affective logic can be seen as a system of reasoning that aims not just at determining the validity of arguments but aims towards reaching value-based conclusions. In the context of this paper, we define affective logic operationally as an African cultural model of logic in which conclusions of arguments are embedded in desirable cultural values. The cultural import of this definition shall become clear as we deal with instances of affective logic in African culture as elucidated by Etuk.

In discussing affective logic, Etuk starts out by raising a number of fundamental questions on the subject. Such questions include: is there or is there not African logic? If anything like that exists, what are its distinguishing characteristics? If there is no such thing, then why is there no such thing? Is it the sort of thing that could be created; or would any such attempt regionalize what is a universal discipline and, therefore, debase it? It is reflections on these questions that lead him to the conclusion that “there are good reasons and many precedents for regionalizing or domesticating and enculturating philosophy. The implication of this position is that there has to be African logic if there is African Philosophy”.³¹ Drawing from Dewey’s assertion that without Greek religion, Greek art and Greek civic life, their philosophy would have been impossible, Etuk posits that philosophy always grows out of a people’s concern to understand their world and their lives so as to be guided thereby. For when Dewey was talking about Greek religion, art, civic life and so on as the basis of Greek philosophy, these are all perspectives of Greek culture. For Etuk, this conception of philosophy is not diametrically opposed to the universal quality of the discipline. He maintains that philosophy is a universal discipline only in the sense that the quest for understanding reality generally is something that every human group undertakes. How they undertake this quest, the solutions to their puzzles, the answers to their questions are bound to differ from people to people.

Based on the above, and reacting to the view of Chukwuemeka Nze who held that philosophy like music is without boundaries, Etuk says that “philosophy is, like music a universal activity: but then every culture has its own music: its own instruments for producing music: its criteria for judging music as beautiful or bad, and its expert musicians too. In other words, African music has its own distinctive features and characteristics, which distinguish it from say, European music or

³¹Udo Etuk. “The Possibility of African Logic”. *The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu*. Edited by Olusegun Oladipo (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2002), 100.

Indian music. And even in Africa, Nigerians who dig high-life music or juju music would not dig Ethiopian music; it would leave them cold".³² The practical implication of this is that though philosophy is a universal quest, it has boundaries delimited and defined by its culture-embeddedness. To our understanding, Etuk's position here is that philosophical reflections do not originate in a cultural vacuum or void. To be meaningful and useful, they have to be rooted in culture-specific experiences, though this does not imply that they cannot have universal relevance or utility. What implication does this have for logic?

Etuk believes that what is true of philosophy must be true for logic. A look into the history of logic reveals that Chinese logic, Indian logic or even Arabic logic are all seen and regarded as legitimate fields of study. If it is possible to have Chinese logic, for instance, then there is nothing to rule the possibility of African logic out of court, even before the discussion has gone underway; or to make it sound preposterous, if not ridiculous. We may infer from here that, for Etuk, the methods of science and discovery we inherited from the West are not the only legitimate methods of discovery. This leaves open the strong possibility of African logic; of African ways of cognizing reality and African ways of discovery. It is important to note here that Etuk does not deny the fact that thought and reasoning are universal human characteristics. He only maintains that thought is never about nothing. It is always about the particularities of human experiences, problems and challenges. These factors influence and shape the way humans think and reason. Thus, Etuk rejects the dogma of a singular standard prototype of reasoning. For him, there is strong evidence that there is logic, even in predominantly oral cultures.

Etuk identifies two specific factors that appear to impinge on the way Africans reason. First is the African perception of time. He notes that there is a discrepancy in temporal perception which may obfuscate meaningful human dialogue between the African and the Westerner. The difference lies in the fact that while the Westerner feels himself controlled by time, and is literally enslaved by its chronometers, the African gives the impression that time was made for man. Hence, it is the failure to come to terms with the African perception of time that has made Westerners to invent the term 'African time' as a term of derogation. The African truly understands and attends to his planting time, weeding time, harvest time, fishing time and so on. It is the Western view of man as driven by industrial time that creates the distortion for the African and a discrepancy in the way others see the African.

³² Ibid. 102.

The second factor that Etuk considers is the status factor. He observes that this factor has a way of intervening in the reasoning of the African, and as such deserves to be studied closely. According to him:

Human relationships are very significant and important in Africa. If someone for instance, commits an offence against a community, the African thing to do is to first of all determine the status or relationship which the offender stands to the offended community. If the offender is an in law or a grandchild (not necessarily understood as a blood grandchild, but rather as the child of any daughter who belongs by birth to the community), the penalty may be waved altogether or greatly tempered.³³

To buttress the above point, Etuk paints a hypothetical picture that can easily be recognized as a predominant phenomenon in the Ibibio culture of Nigeria. Following him, we here present the argument with its premises, the intervening status factor, and the conclusion arrived at:

1. If anyone cuts another person's palm fruits, then he will pay this fine.
2. S has cut another person's palm fruits.

But given the two premises, it does not follow that:

S must pay this fine;

Because the status of the person intervenes:

But S is a grandchild of this community.

Therefore, S will not pay this fine.

The above prototype of reasoning is common place in the traditional African setting. Most times, rather than punish an offender, the status of the offender to the offended has a way of intervening and influencing the conclusion reached. The moment a criminal is apprehended in the African cultural setting, one of the questions that come up first is who the parents of the criminal are.

The moment this is established, the relationship of the offender to the offended community can lead the judge or council of judges to make recommendations towards reforming the offender and reintegrating him into the community, rather than just merely exacting punitive measures. In some legal cases, out-of-court settlements are more rational and humane rather than reaching logical conclusions that could leave some disputing parties punished. This is what the affective method is about. Whether we are dealing with a problem needing settlement or with an amount of goods to be distributed or with justice to be dispensed, there is always some special consideration given to status or

³³Ibid., 112.

relationship. This affective quality is played out in the traditional method of savings called *osusu*; in the communal and synergetic form of existence of the traditional society; in the traditional African's idea of cooperating with nature, rather than conquering her and so on. The queue culture where service providers urge their customers to join a queue in order to be attended to gives some sense of order. However, in banks, filling stations and so on, some persons do not join the queue in order to be served. It is common place to find a young man give up his position on a queue for an aged person, a pregnant woman or a public office-holder. In these instances, the stricture of a bivalent logic is suspended in order to reach a value-based conclusion. As noted by Sylvanus Udoidem, a type of logic, such as the linear or dichotomous reasoning of 'either or' as is evident in the laws of thought, is only a type of logic. Reality has many other logical forms which when investigated help to make sense of the world of experience. Citing an example, Udoidem states that President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria made a political statement that his administration is neither leftist nor rightist; rather, that the policies and programmes of his administration tilt to both left and right, 'a little to the right and a little to the left'. To some, this statement represented the height of absurdity as one cannot be both hot and cold, but must be either hot or cold. We will add here that there is a middle ground. Being warm can be conceived as being both hot and cold or being neither hot nor cold. For many-valued logicians, this third category has a creative meaning and can be explained to be in line with alternative systems of logic that either recognize truth-value glut or truth-value gap. Udoidem concludes that "on the Nigerian scene, very few people were able to appreciate the ontology and the logic of thought that justified Babangida's assertion"³⁴. What positive implications can the method of affective logic, which is rooted African culture, have in our political sphere? This is our next concern.

Nigeria's Political Development in a Post-Truth Era: The Need for a Transvaluation of Values through an Affective Methodology

Innocent Asouzu holds that the situation of the contemporary African can be compared to a type of institutionalized conflict-laden situation where each individual seeks to conserve his interests first in utter disregard for the legitimacy conferred by the legitimizing role of the common good. Comparing the present day African society with the traditional African society of the past, he remarks that "this [traditional African] society was, largely not one of a collection of competing and opportunistic individuals whose interests stood at loggerheads with each other.

³⁴Udoidem, Sylvanus. "Opposites as Complements: The Significance of Zen Logic". *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Reasoning*. Edited by O. Onuobia Port Harcourt: Hercon Publishers, 1992, 300.

Here, people made efforts to give others a chance in the evident hope that these efforts would be reciprocated.”³⁵ What this means is that those values that formed the bulwarks of the traditional society have been relegated to the background in the present-day society. Corruption, armed robbery, sexual immorality, lack of value for human life, terrorism, insecurity, fraud, armed hostilities and all other negative vices that are prevalent in the society point to the fact that something is wrong with our system of values. The values that served to preserve the pristine society have either been abandoned or seriously diffused through cross-cultural integration. Of course, with globalization as a contemporary phenomenon, it is common for such values to be eroded. We live in a post-truth era – an era where individuals care less about the true and right but focus more on what yields desired outcome. In today’s world, economics is not about reaching equilibrium in consumer satisfaction but about profit maximization. Politics is about the ability to achieve and maintain political power through any means, whether honorable or not.

In this paper, we have argued that values, including of course ‘African values’, are a temporal in the sense that the fact that a value is traditional does not necessarily connote that it is unprogressive, backward, superstitious and hence unnecessary for development. In this sense, since we cannot say that a value should be ‘modernized’ in order for it to be useful to the modern African, we are arguing that such values which are necessary for development should be transvalued. Transvaluation here signifies a sifting process aimed at bringing back those positive traditional values that we find in the indigenous African societies and their cultures and applying them in the contemporary African society. In this way, traditional African cultural values can form the basis of Africa’s development. As a way of applying these values, this paper recommends that education and social re-orientation can be used as tools for the achievement of this goal.

The strong kinship relationship that exists in the traditional society should be brought to bear on our political sphere, if political development is to be attained. This brotherly approach can be the magic wand against politically motivated violence, assassination, election rigging and emasculation of the opposition. If the value of synergetic existence is imbued in political actors, it would to a great extent reduce the tension and anxiety which fuel our political backwardness. An effective approach to politics will not encourage a winner-takes-it-all situation. It would rather seek to encourage the opposition, in the sense that they are needed as a catalyst to boost the performance of the majority in pointing out the grey areas that need to be improved upon. The traditional societies may not have been very rich materially, by today’s standards; but they were very rich in morality. The lesson

³⁵Innocent Asouzu. *The Method and Principles* Op.cit., 238

that this leaves us with is that if the glamour of public office is reduced to some extent, this would help elected officers to focus more on delivering the dividends of democracy to their constituents.

Is there no aspect of the traditional society that can be said to be inimical to positive political development? Are there no such areas that run contrary to indices of political development, like periodically held free and fair elections, peaceful transition in government, guaranteed freedom and basic liberties, respect for the rule of law, institutional autonomy and the separation of powers? Many traditional African societies are founded on monarchical systems that were in some cases absolute and hereditary. Does this not contradict democracy in its entirety? Of course, a system in which a leader can only emerge when the sitting leader vacates office by death is against democracy. More than that, the sit-tight tendency of most unpopular leaders may not be unconnected to this aspect of culture. What should we do about this? Let us respond by using an affective methodology. Gyekye³⁶ has noted that the critical revaluation of a received cultural tradition will not only suggest refinement or appropriate amendment that ought to be made to it, but also a direct attention to the aspects of it that ought to be expunged from the cultural life and thought of a people. We will add that the aspect pointed out above is one that should be 'expunged' in order for political development to be achieved. When positive dimensions of Nigeria's culture and traditions are brought to bear on democracy, political development will ensue and traditional values will be our unique contribution to the world within the present-day global context.

Conclusion

Culture is dynamic and it always seeks out to maintain and strengthen the values which are necessary for the survival and development of its people. While the negative aspects of the African cultural past can be confined to history, African societies can only ignore the need for the values of co-operative existence, moral probity and other positive traditional African values on the pain of underdevelopment. The system of values that guided the traditional societies did not give room for corruption, immorality, terrorism and other negative vices that can be observed in our political sphere. The peculiarities that mark the post-truth era, like rapid spread of misinformation, lies and political propaganda can be redirected and made to have a positive impact. The internet is only a tool. Transvaluation of positive cultural values through education and social reorientation can lead to the desired effect of political renaissance. The prevalence of vices such as electoral violence, disrespect for the rule of law, human rights abuses, high level of

³⁶Kwame Gyekye. *Op. cit.*, 178.

corruption and so on, point to the fact that either our traditional values have been greatly diffused to be of little meaningful impact, or a wrong system of values altogether has been cultivated. Either way, the need for a trans-valuation of values is compelling. So long as positive time-tested cultural values are relegated to the background, so long shall our political development remain illusory.

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