

## **Russell's Logico-centric Commitment: is Logic The Essence of Metaphysics and Philosophy?**

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### **Abstract**

Bertrand Russell authored the chapter titled "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy" as the second essay in his book *Our Knowledge of the External World*. There is a difference between viewing logic as 'essential to' philosophy as opposed to seeing logic as 'the essence' of philosophy. It is incontestable that logic is essential to philosophy as its tool. However, Russell's idea that all philosophy is logic is analogical to saying that a tool is more important than the work that it helps one to accomplish. This is what this research described as 'Russell's logico-centric commitment'. This research demonstrated that this commitment presents an idea of philosophy that is oversimplified. Logic as the essence of philosophy only makes sense when viewed from the perspective of this oversimplification. The implication is that while Russell's idea of philosophy is too narrow, his idea of logic is too wide. Both conceptions are flawed when weighed against the criteria for real definition. While logic is a valuable tool in philosophical enquiry, it is not the sole or ultimate focus of philosophy which encompasses metaphysics, epistemology and axiology as concerns with reality, knowledge and values respectively. Using the method of critical analysis, this research argued that Russell's error can be corrected when logic is viewed correctly as the tool that it is, not the goal of philosophy which has to do with understanding reality, knowledge and values.

**Keywords:** Logic Metaphysics Epistemology Axiology Real Definition Philosophy

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## Introduction

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970) is without doubt, a philosopher of many parts. Apart from being a frontline analytic philosopher, he is a logician, philosopher of mathematics, epistemologist, psychologist, moral philosopher, philosopher of education, political philosopher, philosopher of economics, philosopher of history and historian of philosophy, philosopher of Western and Eastern cultures, philosopher of religion, philosopher of science, a frontline political activist of his time and a Nobel Prize winner. Russell's breadth and depth in the concern with reality, knowledge and values make it possible for one to be lost in the maze of his ideas if contextual parameters are not set and adhered to. In fact with the possible exclusion of aesthetics, it can be safely stated that there is no area of philosophy that Russell did not leave a mark. His prolific output spanned the whole range of philosophical thought, and that is why it is believed that he has been more widely read in his own lifetime than any other philosopher in history (Beaney, p. 129). Frederick Copleston a foremost historian of philosophy asserts that "of all British philosophers Bertrand Russell is by far the best known to the world at large" (p. 425). He adds that this is partly due to the fact that Russell has published a very considerable number of books and essays on moral, social and political topics which are salted with amusing and provocative remarks and are written at a level which can be understood by a public that is scarcely capable of appreciating his more technical contributions to philosophical thought. He authored more than seventy books and wrote over two thousand published articles (Monk 1). Before looking into Russell's background and influences, it is important that this research clarifies some key concepts that will be used frequently.

## Clarification of Key Concepts

**Axiology:** This can be defined as the philosophical study of values in general – not just moral, but aesthetic and other forms of value as well (Proudfoot and Lacey p. 29).

**Epistemology:** this is also called theory of knowledge. It is an enquiry into the nature and grounds of knowledge (Proudfoot and Lacey, p.118).

**Logic:** The central topic of logic is valid reasoning, its systematization and the study of notions relevant to it (Proudfoot and Lacey p. 233). Logic can be defined as an organized body of knowledge or science that evaluates argument. It is the study of the principles and criteria of correct inference. Logic belongs to the discipline of philosophy, not as a branch as such, but as its instrument or tool (Darty and Ekefre, How to Teach, 151).

**Metaphysics:** as a word, metaphysics means that which comes after 'physics' where physics means the study of nature in general. A central part of metaphysics is ontology which studies being and what there is in particular (Proudfoot and Lacey, p. 249). Metaphysics is etymologically derived from two Greek words 'meta-ta-physika' meaning 'after the physics'. This word was coined by Andronicus of Rhodes, a librarian in 10AD to categorize some of Aristotle's works that were written about things that were beyond the physical (Anyim and Ekefre p. 6).

**Philosophy:** Philosophy is defined as systematic study of fundamental questions about existence, knowledge and values, aiming to understand the world and the place of humans within it. Philosophy itself is defined as a combination of Greek root words '*philos*' and '*sophia*'

translated to mean 'love of wisdom'. The concerns of philosophy revolve around three core areas namely, reality, knowledge and values; the three major branches of philosophy that deal with these concerns are metaphysics, epistemology and axiology respectively (Darty and Ekefre, How to Teach 151)

**Russell's Logico-centric Commitment:** This is operationally defined in this work as Bertrand Russell's view that philosophy is reducible to logic as expressed in his article "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy" (p. 42).

### **Bertrand Russell: Life, Background and Early Influences**

Russell was born to aristocratic parents who were 'freethinkers'. They are so called because they rejected socially accepted opinions, especially concerning religious beliefs. As 'freethinkers', Russell's parents held that knowledge about truth should be formed only on the basis of logic, reason and empiricism rather than an uncritical deference to authority, tradition, revelation or dogma. Russell's parents died before he turned four. But they had made provisions for him and willed that he be brought up by freethinkers who shared their views on how the society should be organized. After the demise of Russell's parents, his grandparents successfully petitioned the Court to set aside the provision in Russell's parent's will requiring Russell and his siblings to be raised as agnostics. With that aspect of the will set aside, Russell's grandparents succeeded in securing the custody of the young Russell. From all indications, they were determined to protect Russell from coming under the influence of his late parents' convictions. As noted by Nicholas Griffin a contemporary Russell scholar, "the young Russell was told very little about his late parents' beliefs. He only discovered with amazement as an adult how closely they resembled his own" (3). What this means is that somehow, Russell still imbibed beliefs, similar to those of his late parents in spite of deliberate attempts to shield him from such influences by his grandparents.

Bertrand Russell's paternal grandfather, The Earl Russell was a two-time Prime Minister serving under Queen Victoria in the 1840s and 1860s. What this means is that the Russells had been prominent in England even before Bertrand Russell was born. From fifteen years of age, Russell spent time thinking about the validity of Christian religious beliefs and it was after coming in contact with John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* that Russell came to the conclusion that there is no life after death since for him, Mill had given an adequate refutation to the argument from design (Russell, *Autobiography* 36). Mill's objection to this argument which caught the attention of Russell was based on the idea of natural selection of Charles Darwin. Mill observed that nature was fundamentally cruel and that progress in nature was made at the cost of immense pain and suffering. Many things that happen in the natural world of non-human animals for instance, would be punishable as rape, murder and exploitation if they were done by humans. Mill held that since nature is ruthless, it is not reasonable to believe that an intelligent and loving creator would have designed a world which involves so much suffering. This idea was very appealing to the young Russell. For most of his adult life, Russell maintained that religion is harmful to people. He believed that it impedes knowledge, fosters fear and dependency, and is responsible for much of the war, oppression, and misery that we see in the world. He held that a good world needs knowledge, kindness and courage. It does not need a regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long

ago by ignorant men.

Bertrand Russell's elder brother Frank had introduced him to the mathematical work of Euclid and Russell saw that as one of the greatest events of his life. Russell's encounter with that work sustained this interest in mathematics till he eventually won a scholarship to study mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge. He became acquainted with George Edward Moore as a colleague and came under the influence of Alfred North Whitehead his teacher. Russell and Moore both got admitted into Trinity College at a period when the prevailing philosophical systems were Kantian and Hegelian Idealism. As admitted by Russell it was Moore that led way in their rebellion against Kant and Hegel as he only followed Moore's steps closely (*Philosophical Development* p. 42). Another significant intellectual influence on Russell was Gottlob Frege. In fact, it was Russell and Frege who worked on the foundations of mathematics and set the agenda for the emergence of analytic philosophy. Though their interpretation and understanding of the logic of relations is similar, Russell and Frege arrived at their positions independently. Russell states very clearly that "If I should have become acquainted sooner with the work of Professor Frege, I should have owed a great deal to him, but as it is I arrived independently at many results which he had already established" (*Principles*, p. xviii).

Russell attended the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900 where he met Italian philosophers and mathematicians, Giuseppe Peano and Alessandro Padoa. The encounter with Peano and his school in Paris was of momentous importance for Russell. He had been struggling with the problems of the foundation of mathematics for a number of years. After returning from the Paris congress, Russell familiarized himself with the publications of Peano and it became clear to him that Peano's notation was an excellent instrument for logical analysis, the type he had been seeking for years (Russell *Autobiography* p. 218). Russell writes that until he got hold of Peano, it had never occurred to him that symbolic logic would be any use for the principles of mathematics. It was Peano's discovery that relation could be fitted into his system that led Russell to adopt symbolic logic in advancing his position on logicism (Grattan-Guinness, p. 133). For Russell, philosophers should discover some logically ideal language that can exhibit the nature of the world in a manner that is free from the imprecision of natural language.

Russell lectured at Trinity College. He was considered for a Fellowship, which would have given him a vote in the college government and that would have granted him some immunity protecting him from being dismissed for his social and political activism. This privilege was denied him because of his stance on religion. In 1916, because of his active participation in pacifist agitations and anti-war writings against the First World War, Russell was dismissed from Trinity College. Russell described his dismissal as an illegitimate means to violate freedom of expression. His dismissal had created a scandal since the vast majority of the Fellows of the College opposed the decision. The ensuing pressure from the Fellows induced the Council to reinstate Russell. In January 1920, it was announced that Russell had accepted the reinstatement offer from Trinity. In July 1920, Russell applied for a one year leave of absence which he spent giving lectures in China and Japan. In January 1921, it was announced that Russell had resigned and his resignation had been accepted. This resignation was completely voluntary and was not the result of another altercation. It is suspected that the reason for the

resignation was that Russell was going through a difficult time in his private life with a divorce and subsequent remarriage. Russell did not have a very smooth marital life. He got married four times to different persons and was divorced three times. He married Alys Pearsall Smith from 1894 to 1921; Dora Black from 1921 to 1935; Patricia Spence from 1936 to 1952 and Edith Finch in 1952 till his death in 1970.

Russell still had running battles with academic institutions in his time due to his non-conformist posture. He taught at the University of Chicago, later moving on to Los Angeles to lecture at the University of California. He was appointed Professor at the City College of New York in 1940, but after a public outcry the appointment was annulled by a court judgment that pronounced him morally unfit to teach at the College due to his radical views. Many intellectuals led by John Dewey, protested against his treatment. Russell soon joined the Barnes Foundation, lecturing to a varied audience on the history of philosophy. These lectures formed the basis of *A History of Western Philosophy* which became a best-seller and provided Russell with a steady income for the remaining part of his life. His relationship with the Albert Barnes soon got sour; he was dismissed by Barnes without regards for due process. Russell took the matter to court, won the case and got a hefty compensation from Barnes before returning to the United Kingdom in 1944 to rejoin the faculty of Trinity College. In the course of his teaching, Russell was approached by the Austrian engineering student Ludwig Wittgenstein, who later became his doctorate degree student. Russell viewed Wittgenstein as a genius and successor who would continue his work on logic and greatly encouraged Wittgenstein. Russell supported his family by writing popular books explaining matters of physics, ethics, and education to the layman. He died of influenza on 2 February 1970 at his home. In accordance with his will, there was no religious ceremony; his body was cremated and his ashes were scattered over the Welsh mountains.

### **Bertrand Russell's Conception of Philosophy**

Bertrand Russell is one of the most versatile philosophers of the twentieth century. He has defended different positions from his early attraction to the absolute idealism of the neo-Hegelian tradition to naive realism, from pure mathematics to empiricism, from pluralism to neutral monism. This why for a thinker like Alan Wood, Russell can be best described as “a philosopher without a philosophy” or “a philosopher of all philosophies” (Wood, *Russell's Philosophy*, p. 86). Some thinkers have maintained that in supporting these different positions at different times Russell's primary interest appears to be the attempt to justify science (Weitz p. 102; Clack p. 63). This however was the concern of a more mature Bertrand Russell. If we go to the roots of his attraction to Mill's dismissal of the argument from design, it appears that Russell's original interest in philosophy was mainly derived from his eagerness to discover if philosophy could provide any defense for religious beliefs. But soon he gave up his belief in free will, immortality and God. As elucidated by Alan Wood, Russell had two conceptions of philosophy: philosophy as analysis and philosophy as a no man's land (*Cautionary Notes*, p. 204). This research will now look into them piece-meal. The goal of this is to examine the role that logic plays in these conceptions of philosophy as presented by Russell.



Russell saw philosophy as an analysis of the complex into its simple constituents. He had as well set out machinery for generating compound statements from simple ones. He called the simple statements atomic propositions and these were distinguished from more complex statements which he called molecular propositions. Atomic statements have no parts which are themselves statements whereas molecular propositions are composed of statements. The first part of Russell's doctrine consisted in showing that molecular propositions are in all cases nothing but atomic propositions combined in various ways by the use of connectives. This part of Russell's logical doctrine proved of great value in simplifying certain problems of philosophical analysis. This can be seen as an attempt to "eliminate the particularity of the original subject-matter and to confine our attention entirely to the logical *form* of the facts concerned" (Russell *Our Knowledge*, 189-190). Analytic philosophy, the trend Russell spearheaded was a rebellion against idealism. It drew inspiration, philosophically from British empiricism. However, there are differences between the traditional empiricism and analytic philosophy as represented by Russell. Locke, when he declared the mind to be a '*tabula rasa*' did so by analyzing the possible contents of the new mind, and concluded that there could be nothing on the mind at such a state since experience was yet to make an impression on it. This was a radical proclamation against the Cartesian theory of innate ideas. Empiricism suffered from the lack of proper logical apparatus to deal with analysis. Russell, being inspired by Frege's protest against psychologism distinguishes the new analytic movement from the traditional empiricism in the sense that the 'analytical empiricism' as he calls it incorporates mathematics with modern logic as the tool or technique of analysis.

Russell maintains that philosophy is a 'no man's land' in between science and theology. Philosophical questions are questions which science cannot answer. On the other hand, theology claims to know the answers to such questions without offering convincing grounds, or recourse to empirical verification. Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of great importance. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them. *For Russell,*

*Philosophy is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has so far been unascertainable; but like science it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge or so I should contend belongs to science; all dogmas as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land exposed to attack from both sides and this No Man's Land is philosophy (Russell History p. 2).*

Within the domain of philosophy, Russell believed that those philosophies were better which followed scientific and mathematical methods. He identified the idealistic philosophies of the Hegelian tradition as an unfortunate legacy from theology. It is natural of course for philosophy as a subject intermediary between science and religion to have leanings to either side. So there are philosophies with religious orientation and philosophies with scientific orientation. For Russell, philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to

its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good (Russell, *The Problems* p. 93-94).

### **Russell on Logic as the Essence of Philosophy**

Russell held the opinion that all philosophical topics all reduce themselves, in so far as they are genuinely philosophical, to problems of logic. In explaining this idea, he states that “this situation is not due to any accident, but to the fact that every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be in the sense in which we are using the word logical” (Russell, *Logic as the Essence* p. 42). Russell held that philosophical schools should be characterized by their logic, not by their metaphysics. Russell's favorable leaning towards logic can be traced to his disillusionment with the monistic philosophy of the neo-Hegelian and Kantian tradition. Russell was especially dissatisfied with the doctrine of internal relation preached by that tradition according to which two terms when related by a particular relation becomes a different term. For Russell, this account made mathematics inexplicable (Russell *My Philosophical*, p. 9-10). This conclusion of the monistic philosophy was for Russell a necessary corollary of the Aristotelian term-logic where every proposition was composed of only two terms, subject and predicate. A relation thus gets transformed to a predicate (quality) of the subject. Russell held the position that fidelity to the subject-predicate logic leads to monism.

*From the foregoing, it is clear that the development of symbolic logic helped Russell to see philosophical problems from a very different point of view. Some propositions which were treated as categorically ascribing predicate to a subject either universally or particularly in traditional logic were viewed by Russell as either hypothetical or existential statements. A universal proposition of the form 'All S is P' is now understood as 'in all possible cases, if anything is an S, then it is P'. Again, a particular proposition of the form 'Some S is P' is seen as 'there is at least one entity such that it is both S and P'. It is obvious that the two ways of viewing are completely different. The universal proposition is no more in subject-predicate form as it does not assert anything about anything. The hypothetical character of the proposition is further explained in terms of 'material implication' which is not equivalent to an 'if - then' statement. Again the particular proposition is reformulated as an existential statement in respect of a variable whose value is not determined. This again is not in subject-predicate form. Moreover, there are propositions with one place predicates, such as 'everything is determined' and 'something is valuable' which do not have reference to any definite subject. Existence is made the property of propositional functions so that universal propositions and singular propositions are deprived of existential import “All men are mortal” does not imply that there is anything to be called man. Propositions about ordinary proper names, such as Socrates, (e.g. Socrates is a philosopher) does not imply 'Socrates exists'. These proper names are also seen as abbreviations for descriptions. Descriptions in turn are shown to be misleading expressions*

found in ordinary language; hence they should be dispensed with by following the method of logical analysis. Russell pointed out several flaws in the monistic idealism of the Hegelian tradition which he saw as results of adherence to the subject-predicate form of propositions.

*Russell did not think very highly of Aristotle's syllogism. He raised a three-point criticism against the syllogism based on:*

- (1) *Formal defects within the system itself. Aristotle does not draw any distinction between the two statements: 'Socrates is a man' and 'all Greeks are men'.*
- (2) *Over-estimation of the syllogism as compared to other forms of deductive argument. Within logic, there are non-syllogistic inferences such as 'a horse is an animal; therefore a horse's head is an animal's head'. Valid syllogisms in fact are only some among valid deductions and have no logical priority over others.*
- (3) *Over-estimation of deduction as a form of argument. With these three points of criticism, Russell concludes that "any person who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle or any of his disciples" (Russell Aristotle's Logic 124).*

### **Critical Remarks on Russell's Logico-centric Commitment**

Russell held the opinion that:

Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to analysis and purification, is found to either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical. But the word 'logic' is never used in the same sense by two different philosophers some explanation of what I mean by the word is indispensable at the outset. Logic, in the middle ages, and down to the present day in teaching, meant no more than a scholastic collection of technical terms and rules of syllogistic inference. Aristotle had spoken and it was the part of humbler men merely to repeat the lesson after him. The trivial nonsense embodied in this tradition is still set in examinations, and defended by eminent authorities as an excellent 'propaedeutic', i.e. a training in those habits of solemn humbug which are so great a help in later life. But it is not this that I mean to praise in saying that all philosophy is logic. (Russell, *Logic as the Essence* p. 42)

The notion of 'all philosophy is logic' implied here is what this research sees as a possible flaw when weighed against the criteria for real definitions. A real definition should neither be too broad, nor too narrow. A definition is too broad when its definiens includes too much and this is a deficiency. It is in this light that Russell's conception of logic amounts to equating the process with its product. Logic is the tool used in the process of philosophy, not the product itself.

On the other hand, Russell's conception of philosophy in this context appears to be too narrow and oversimplified. A definition is too narrow when its definiens includes too little to the point of excluding the essential properties of the definiendum. This is exactly what Russell's logico-centric commitment leads to. It ignores the essential aspects of philosophy which should constitute its real definition and as stated on the outset, it is only when viewed in this wrong



and oversimplified, reductionist manner that the idea of 'all philosophy is logic' appears to be meaningful. Another question that arises could be: what if Russell was only employing a figurative use of language? What if it is only a metaphor? This is possible since Ludwig Wittgenstein had switched language as an object designation theory of meaning for language as a labyrinth of paths (Wittgenstein p. 203). The answer to this question is that Russell's idea would still fail to meet the criteria for real definitions because a real definition should not be figurative, involving metaphors instead of exposing the essential meaning of the term. Perhaps one way of viewing the logico-centric commitment can be from the perspective of analytic philosophy, a movement that Russell championed. Can the idea be seen to have merits within that context?

As one of the founders of analytic philosophy, Russell held that it is the philosopher's job to discover a logically ideal language that will exhibit the nature of the world in a precise manner, such that we will not be misled by the imprecision of natural language. Russell believed that many problems of philosophy arose because of the misleading nature of ordinary language and so could be solved with the apparatus of logical analysis. For Russell, logic was not just a tool for understanding the foundations of mathematics; it was also a tool for the analysis of language. His attempt at this actually stood him out as a leading light in analytic philosophy. He held that the natural world cannot be comprehensively understood with natural language. In the words of Russell, "ordinary language is totally limited for expressing what physics really asserts, since the words of everyday life are not sufficiently abstract. Only mathematics and mathematical logic can say as little as the physicist means to say (Russell *The Scientific*, p. 82).

In dealing with the natural or external world, Russell made use of the metaphysics of logical atomism. According to this idea, the world consists of a complex of logical atoms and their properties and relations. It is these atoms that form atomic facts, which combine to give us logically complex objects. Thus for him the entities we see are logical constructions formed from our senses. Russell explained his logical atomism by setting forth his conception of an ideal isomorphic language that would mirror the world in the sense that our knowledge will be reduced to atomic propositions and their truth-functional compounds. Logical atomism is a brand of empiricism because it holds that the most important requirement for such an ideal language is that every meaningful proposition must consist of terms referring directly to the objects with which we are acquainted. One of the central themes of Russell's atomism is that the world consists of logically independent facts, and that our knowledge depends on the data of our direct experience of these facts. For Russell philosophy should be an exercise of breaking things down into their simplest components.

Russell chose the name 'logical atomism' for his philosophy though it is a version of realism. He started with a logical analysis of language since he believed that the structure of language had some relation to the structure of reality (Russell *Philosophical Development* p. 117). He held that language, more particularly the proposition, has to correspond to the reality or to the fact. So in order that the language corresponds to reality, it must be put in the correct logical syntax. That is why he thought it necessary to analyze the ordinary language in order to explicate the exact logical character or *form* of it so that the isomorphism between the two becomes clear. Russell sought to construct an artificial language, or a logical language free from the defects and ambiguities of the ordinary one. The artificial language would be homogeneous in structure

with reality. He adopted the method of analysis because he believed with Leibniz that the task of philosophy was to go from the complex to the simple as opposed to the idealism of his day which moved from simples to complexes.

Bertrand Russell has severally been criticized for inconsistency. For instance he had reproached Alexius Meinong for arguing that we can speak about 'the golden mountain' and 'the round square' and other such entities; and that in so far as we can make true propositions with these entities as subjects, they must have some kind of logical being. Russell insisted that "logic must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology" (*Introduction* 169). At this point there is a firm commitment to a robust sense of realism. However as noted by Udo Etuk, "Russell appears to have abandoned this avowal of realism, and to have taken a purely formalistic analysis, which robs ordinary language, as generally understood by most ordinary language users, and by traditional logicians of its significance." (80). Apart from this, there are other areas where Russell has been charged with inconsistency. Russell himself was conscious about his own shifting stand-points and that is why he asserts "although I have changed my opinion on various matters since those early days, I have not changed on points which, then as now, seemed of most importance" (*Philosophical Development* p. 49). **In spite of Russell's honest admittance of his lack of consistency especially on matters which he considered to be of less importance, his zealous defenders like Herbert Hochberg (p. 10) and Morris Weitz (p. 58) have defended the position** that the charge of inconsistency is 'absolutely untrue'. It is because of Russell's shifting positions that make a thinker like Alan Wood to describe him as "a philosopher without a philosophy" or "a philosopher of all philosophies" (Wood, Russell's Philosophy 86). The point here is that even an avowed commitment to the analysis of language does not excuse Russell of the definitional problems in his idea. After all, analytic philosophy itself has a cardinal goal of the clarification of meaning.

## Conclusion

Bertrand Russell is definitely a philosopher of note in the analytic tradition. However, he appears to have been carried away by the effectiveness of the analytic method and logic as the tool of philosophy. The phrase 'all philosophy is logic' which is traceable to him is involved in definitional flaws on multiple fronts. Firstly, while a real definition should not be too narrow, Russell's notion of philosophy here is narrow. It is oversimplified and reductionist. Secondly, while a real definition should not be too broad, Russell's idea of logic is too broad, more like equating an instrument used in a process to its finished product. Thirdly, was Russell's idea contextual and metaphorical? A real definition should not make use of figurative language that tends to obfuscate rather than clarify meaning. Fourthly, while a real definition should state the essential properties of the definiendum in its definiens, Russell's statement that all philosophy is logic does not elucidate the essential concerns of philosophy which are reality, knowledge and values. In this sense, while it can be safely stated that logic is essential to philosophy, it cannot be safely stated that logic is the essence or goal of philosophy. The latter has a wider sphere which includes the former as its tool or instrument.

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