



Joan Tronto's Moral and Political Dimensions of Ethics of Care

Dr Emmanuel Edeh CMF
Claretian University of Nigeria
Department of Philosophy
emmanueledeh62@yahoo.com

Abstract

A revolutionary paradigm for comprehending both political and moral commitment is provided by Joan Tronto's ethics of caring. Tronto views care as a relational and context-sensitive activity that encompasses attentiveness, accountability, competence, responsiveness, and, ultimately, democratic inclusivity, going beyond conventional justice-based or rights-focused theories. This essay explores care as a moral and political virtue, emphasizing how traditional frameworks of abstract, individualistic moral reasoning are challenged by ethical attention to dependency, vulnerability, and relational interdependence. It places Tronto's work within a larger feminist ethical discourse, highlighting the moral importance of fostering social relationships and the frequently unseen labor of care. In terms of politics, Tronto's concept of a caring democracy emphasizes the significance of incorporating care into public institutions and governance frameworks, supporting laws that acknowledge, encourage, and reallocate caregiving. Rather than depending exclusively on formal equality or legal frameworks, Tronto's perspective sheds light on how society institutions might promote justice through attentiveness, accountability, and relational responsiveness by linking moral philosophy and political theory. In addition to discussing its global and cross-cultural application, the paper delves deeper into the practical and policy consequences of Tronto's care ethics, including its relevance to healthcare, social services, and civic involvement. In the end, Tronto's vision places care at the core of moral and political existence, calling for a reconsideration of social priorities that uphold human interdependence, foster democratic accountability, and confront systemic inequities that devalue caregiving activities.

Keywords: *Ethics of care, moral responsibility, political philosophy, feminist ethics, caring democracy, social justice, relational ethics*

Introduction

The moral theory known as the ethics of care implies that there is moral significance in the fundamental elements of relationships and dependencies in human life. Normatively, care ethics seeks to maintain relationships by contextualizing and promoting the well-being of care-givers and care-receivers in a network of social relations. Most often defined as a practice or virtue rather than a theory as such, "care" involves maintaining the world of, and meeting the needs of, ourselves and others. It builds on the motivation to care for those who are dependent and vulnerable, and it is inspired by both memories of being cared for and the idealizations of self. Care

can serve both as a moral value and a foundation for the political success of a good society. It offers a way to change paradigms, move beyond moral boundaries, and advance towards more just and caring societies.. Tronto, care can serve both as a moral value and a foundation for the political success of a good society. It offers a way to change paradigms, move beyond moral boundaries, and advance towards more just and caring societies. Realizing this, however, requires that we analyze how today's society views care and what power dynamics are involved. Tronto's project reframes care as a practice that is morally indispensable and politically constitutive. In *Moral Boundaries*, she argues that care involves a series of phases including caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving which together uncover moral and political assumptions about dependency, power, and social structure. Her later work in *Caring Democracy* amplifies this insight by arguing that democratic institutions must be reimagined to integrate care as a public value, not merely a private obligation. The purpose of this article is to explore care as a multidimensional concept, one that encompasses ethical sensibility, moral responsibility, and political commitment. Through conceptual analysis and critical engagement with Tronto's texts, this article demonstrates that care ethics not only deepens our understanding of moral agency but also demands a rethinking of political practice that more faithfully reflects human interdependence, vulnerability, and justice.

Conceptual Foundations of Care

Because it depends upon contextual considerations, care is notoriously difficult to define. As Ruddick points out, at least three distinct but overlapping meanings of care have emerged in recent decades: an ethic defined in opposition to justice, a kind of labor, and a particular relationship (Tronto 1998, 4). However, in care ethical literature, 'care' is most often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, and is frequently portrayed as an overlapping set of concepts. For example, Held notes that care is a form of labor, but also an ideal that guides normative judgment and action, and she characterizes care as “clusters” of practices and values (2006, 36, 40). One of the most popular definitions of care, offered by Tronto and Bernice Fischer, construes care as “a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment”. This definition posits care fundamentally as a practice, but Tronto further identifies four sub-elements of care that can be understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals. These sub-elements are: (1) attentiveness, a proclivity to become aware of need; (2) responsibility, a willingness to respond and take care of need; (3) competence, the skill of providing good and successful care; and (4) responsiveness, consideration of the position of others as they see it and recognition of the potential for abuse in care (Toronto 1994, 126-136). Tronto's definition is praised for how it admits to cultural variation and extends care beyond family and domestic spheres, but it is also criticized for being overly broad, counting nearly every human activity as care.

Joan Tronto advanced care ethics both conceptually and politically, situating care at the intersection of morality and civic life. In *Moral Boundaries*, Tronto delineates care into four dimensions of care

Care has four dimensions, according to the philosopher Joan Tronto.

- 1) **to care about:** care requires first and foremost attention to people and their needs. We here need to recognize the other as an equal who might need our help.

- 2) **to take care:** to help someone requires that we take on his or her fragile condition, that we accept responsibility for his or her well-being.
- 3) **to give care:** it is the actual work of caregiving, which consists in doing certain acts to relieve, help or entertain. This work requires special skills that can be developed over time or through adequate training.
- 4) **receiving care:** the success of the care relationship depends on the capacity of response of the beneficiary. We must help the other to welcome the care and in order to put him or her at ease. It is also the moment of the exchange, where the caregiver evolves personally thanks to this relation

According to this generation, ethics of care caring consists of five phases with different responsibilities (Tronto 2013): caring about – recognising a need for care, caring for – taking responsibility to meet that need, care giving – the actual physical work of providing care, care receiving –

Later, in *Caring Democracy*, Tronto introduced a fifth element, caring with, which situates care within social and political structures. This stage emphasizes collective responsibility, democratic participation, trust, and solidarity, highlighting that care cannot be fully realized solely within private or interpersonal contexts but requires institutional and societal support (Tronto, 2013). The philosophical significance of Tronto's framework lies in its relational and context-sensitive orientation. Care is morally demanding because it is neither optional nor purely instrumental; it requires attentiveness, competence, responsiveness, and accountability. It challenges the notion that moral reasoning can be fully understood apart from the realities of human vulnerability and social interdependence. By foregrounding the ethical centrality of care, Tronto reframes moral evaluation: ethical goodness is measured not merely by adherence to abstract principles but by responsiveness to the needs of others in concrete, context-specific situations. Furthermore, by extending care to the political sphere, she underscores that ethical practice is inseparable from social and institutional conditions, revealing the deep interconnections between personal morality and structural justice (Kittay, 1999). Tronto's conceptualization of care provides a comprehensive moral and political lens through which human relationships, social obligations, and institutional responsibilities can be understood and evaluated. Her framework not only distinguishes care ethics from traditional moral theories but also lays the groundwork for a transformative approach to ethics and politics, one that places human interdependence and relational responsibility at the center of moral life.

Some ethicists prefer to understand care as a practice more fundamental than a virtue or motive because doing so resists the tendency to romanticize care as a sentiment or dispositional trait, and reveals the breadth of caring activities as globally intertwined with virtually all aspects of life. As feminist ethicists, Kittay and Held like to understand care as a practice and value rather than as a virtue because it risks “losing site of it as work” (Held, 2006, 35). Held refutes that care is best understood as a disposition such as compassion or benevolence, but defines “care” as “more a characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition.

Care as a Moral Value

A significant reorientation in moral philosophy, the ethics of care places more emphasis on relational accountability, contextual sensitivity, and awareness of human vulnerability than on abstract, principle-driven reasoning. Formal moral reasoning and universality are the

cornerstones of traditional moral theories like utilitarianism and deontology. While utilitarianism primarily considers the welfare of the group as a whole, deontological ethics stresses obligation and adherence to universal principles regardless of specific situations. The moral significance of reliance, interpersonal interactions, and contextual complexities that define most of human life have been criticized for not being sufficiently addressed by both systems. (Kittay, 2015).

Within feminist moral philosophy, early contributions by Gilligan and Noddings reframed moral inquiry by illustrating how moral reasoning often emerges not from detached calculation but from engaged responsiveness to others in concrete situations. Gilligan demonstrated that moral judgment is deeply shaped by relational experiences, while Noddings articulated care as a fundamental ethical orientation rooted in the recognition of the other's needs. These foundational insights paved the way for normative elaborations that situate care as morally indispensable. Joan Tronto's work is pivotal in extending care from a private moral orientation to a broader moral framework with social and political significance. In *Who Cares?*, Tronto argues that caregiving is an ontological condition of human life rather than an optional virtue. Moral life is constitutively relational: individuals are embedded in networks of dependency and interdependence that demand ethical recognition. This perspective challenges moral theories that abstract the moral subject from its social embeddedness, asserting that attentiveness to vulnerability is morally foundational.

Recent scholarship continues to emphasize the moral centrality of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness the core elements identified by Tronto while expanding care's application to domains including healthcare, professional ethics, and organizational practice (Friedman, 2021). This illustrates a key departure from deontological and utilitarian frameworks: moral agents must be situationally aware and capable of responding appropriately to the lived experiences of others, rather than adhering strictly to universal principles or aggregated outcomes. A defining feature of care ethics is its emphasis on situated ethical judgment. Recognizing the needs of others ("caring about") requires attentiveness that suspends self-interest and perceives the specific circumstances of those in need (Ruddick, 2018). This attentiveness contrasts sharply with detached rationality associated with Kantian duty, and with utilitarian frameworks, which often obscure the particularity of individual needs and the qualitative nature of caring engagements.

Furthermore, care ethics brings power, social inequality, and structural injustice into the moral calculus. Scholars such as Tronto, Rhode, and Friedman highlight how caregiving practices are shaped by gendered, racialized, and class-based divisions of labor. These structural dimensions reveal that moral philosophy must confront the ways in which social conditions devalue care work and obscure its ethical significance. Puig de la Bellacasa extends this critique, arguing that care inevitably involves affective, material, and political dimensions intertwined with broader social forces. Crucially, care as a moral value is not confined to private or personal domains; it implicates social responsibility. Jaggar and Tronto assert that ethical obligations arising from care extend into civic and institutional life. Moral obligations, therefore, demand responsiveness not only to immediate dependents but also to social conditions that marginalize or undervalue care, demonstrating that attending to the well-being of vulnerable populations is both an ethical and social imperative. Care as a moral value reframes ethics around relational responsiveness, contextual judgment, and attentiveness to dependency. It demands that moral philosophy recognize the complex interdependence inherent in human life and the normative weight of caring responsibilities. Morality is evaluated not solely on the basis of abstract principles or aggregated outcomes, but through the quality of moral engagement with others in their concrete

circumstances (Bellacasa, 2017).

Care as a Political Value

As a political theory, care ethics examines questions of social justice, including the distribution of social benefits and burdens, legislation, governance, and claims of entitlement. One of the earliest explorations of the implications of care ethics for feminist political theory was in Seyla Benhabib's article "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory" (Benhabib, 1986). Here, Benhabib traces a basic dichotomy in political and moral theory drawn between the public and private realms. Whereas the former is thought to be the realm of justice, the social and historical, and generalized others, the latter is thought to be the realm of the good life, the natural and atemporal, and concrete others. The former is captured by the favored metaphor of social contract theory and the "state of nature", wherein men roam as adults, alone, independent, and free from the ties of birth by women. Benhabib traces this metaphor, internalized by the male ego, within the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls, and the moral theories of Immanuel Kant and Lawrence Kohlberg. She argues that under this conception, human interdependency, difference, and questions about private life become irrelevant to politics. The earliest substantial account of care as a political philosophy is offered by Tronto, who identifies the traditional boundary between ethics and politics as one of three boundaries which serves to stymie the political efficacy of a woman's care ethic, (the other two being the boundary between the particular and abstract/impersonal moral observer, and the boundary between public and private life) (Tronto, 1993).

While care ethics originated in moral philosophy, its implications extend decisively into political theory. Joan Tronto's work demonstrates that care is not merely a private ethical responsibility but a fundamental political value that shapes democratic legitimacy, justice, and civic life. In Tronto's framework, a society's ethical standing is inseparable from how it organizes, distributes, and values care, and political institutions bear responsibility for both recognizing and facilitating care (Tronto 2015). Tronto critiques liberal democratic frameworks for emphasizing autonomy and individual rights while relegating care to the private domain. She argues that such systems overlook the fact that all citizens experience interdependence and vulnerability at various stages of life. By failing to integrate care into public structures, societies perpetuate inequalities in both moral and political recognition, particularly for caregivers, dependents, and marginalized groups. Tronto emphasizes that care is a form of moral and political practice that requires attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness, not only in personal relationships but within institutional frameworks. The political significance of care has been increasingly recognized in contemporary scholarship. Urban and Ward argue that citizenship is inseparable from care, noting that participation in democratic processes is contingent upon adequate support for care responsibilities. When care obligations are socially and institutionally neglected, individuals' ability to exercise civic rights is constrained. Similarly, Holdo conceptualizes democratic engagement itself as a form of care, suggesting that citizens care for democracy by actively nurturing inclusive public spaces, fostering deliberation, and ensuring equitable representation.

Care ethics as a political lens also interrogates structural inequality. Feminist scholars emphasize that social hierarchies based on gender, race, and class shape both the provision and reception of care. Woodly, Brown, and Harris argue that institutional neglect of care reproduces systemic injustice, marginalizing caregivers while undermining democratic equality. These critiques align with Tronto's insistence that care ethics is inseparable from questions of justice: a political system

cannot be considered just if it fails to recognize and support relational interdependence. Puig de la Bellacasa further stresses that care has material, affective, and political dimensions that cannot be divorced from societal structures, highlighting the ethical stakes of public policy in shaping the possibilities for caring practices. Tronto's notion of caring with extends care into collective and democratic life. Unlike models that treat care as individualized or private, Tronto argues that democracy must institutionalize care through public policy, social programs, and participatory practices. This includes investment in healthcare, childcare, eldercare, and equitable labor policies that recognize caregiving as socially and politically indispensable. Similarly, Engster critiques neoliberal approaches to care that commodify caregiving labor, asserting that such frameworks fail to acknowledge the political and social dimensions of care. A care-centered democracy requires a redistributive ethic, one that addresses systemic inequities in caregiving labor while enhancing citizens' capacities to engage meaningfully in civic life.

Recent scholarship also emphasizes the transformative potential of care in governance. For example, Fraser and Van der Tuin argue that care ethics challenges standard conceptions of citizenship and political obligation by situating relational interdependence as a normative criterion for social policies. By reframing care as a political responsibility, states are called to recognize that democratic membership entails both rights and reciprocal responsibilities for sustaining human and institutional well-being. This perspective underscores that care is not only a moral practice but a political infrastructure, essential for sustaining equality, inclusion, and participatory justice.

The politics of care further intersects with global and transnational concerns. In an increasingly interconnected world, care ethics informs debates on migration, climate justice, and public health. Scholars such as Tronto and Held highlight that democratic societies must expand their understanding of care to encompass global interdependencies, recognizing that neglecting care at the systemic level whether through environmental degradation, underfunded healthcare, or economic exploitation has profound ethical and political consequences. Care as a political value reorients the theory and practice of democracy. It challenges the traditional dichotomy between private and public spheres, reframing care as a structural and civic responsibility. By situating attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness within institutional frameworks, Tronto and contemporary scholars illustrate that care is essential not only for moral life but for sustainable democratic governance. Political legitimacy, civic engagement, and social justice all hinge on the recognition and institutionalization of care, demonstrating that care ethics provides a normative framework for both morality and political life (Woodly et al., 2021).

Integrating Care and Justice

A central contribution of Joan Tronto's ethics of care is its insistence that care cannot be fully understood as a private moral practice but must be integrated with broader conceptions of justice. While traditional theories of justice particularly liberal and rights-based frameworks prioritize formal equality, impartiality, and universal rights, they often neglect the relational, context-sensitive, and dependency-laden dimensions of human life (Kittay, 2015). Care ethics complements and challenges these approaches by emphasizing the moral and political significance of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness, and solidarity, highlighting that justice requires both equitable distribution of resources and acknowledgment of care needs. Tronto's notion of caring with illustrates the intersection between care and justice. She argues that a just society is one in which care is institutionally recognized, publicly valued, and

equitably distributed, rather than relegated to the private sphere or disproportionately assumed by women and marginalized groups. In this framework, justice is not only procedural, ensuring formal rights, but also substantive, attending to the social and material conditions necessary for human flourishing. Fraser extends this insight, emphasizing that justice must incorporate both recognition and redistribution; addressing structural inequalities that devalue care labor or render dependency invisible. The integration of care and justice also challenges the impersonal abstraction of dominant moral theories. For instance, Rawls' theory of justice assumes idealized autonomous agents capable of exercising choice independently of care obligations, ignoring the ways in which dependency and relational obligations shape agency. Tronto critiques this abstraction, showing that ethical and political life cannot be separated from the practical realities of caregiving and dependency (Held, 2017). Similarly, Kittay argues that neglecting caregiving labor and the vulnerabilities it entails perpetuates systemic injustice, emphasizing that justice must attend to the moral and material conditions of care work.

Integrating care into justice carries profound policy implications. States that embrace care as a political value must design social, economic, and legal systems that support caregiving labor, reduce burdens on marginalized populations, and guarantee access to healthcare, childcare, eldercare, and other essential social services (Holdo, 2025). Justice is therefore not only about abstract resource allocation but about creating social and institutional conditions that enable citizens to live with dignity, participate fully in civic life, and maintain relational networks essential to well-being. Tronto emphasizes that caring democracies require both recognition of care needs and structural mechanisms that sustain equitable participation.

Contemporary scholarship has highlighted the global and intersectional dimensions of integrating care and justice. Woodly et al. argue that gendered, racialized, and economic inequalities shape the distribution of care responsibilities and access to institutional support. Ignoring these intersecting factors perpetuates systemic injustice and undermines social cohesion and democratic legitimacy. Puig de la Bellacasa further demonstrates that care ethics must account for material, affective, and ecological interdependencies, expanding the concept of justice beyond anthropocentric concerns to include sustainability, environmental stewardship, and the well-being of communities and ecosystems. From a theoretical standpoint, integrating care with justice challenges the binary between rights and responsibilities. While rights-based theories emphasize entitlements, they often neglect the obligations to sustain, nurture, and respond to human needs. Care ethics situates obligations at the center of justice, making it relationally grounded, context-sensitive, and morally robust. Justice is therefore not an abstract metric but a dynamic, practice-oriented concept that requires attention to vulnerability, relational dependency, and institutional support. The integration of care and justice also fosters a more inclusive conception of democratic legitimacy. By recognizing caregiving and dependency as fundamental to social and political life, societies can move toward equitable participation and social accountability, ensuring that all citizens not just the privileged or independent can exercise civic rights meaningfully (Holdo, 2025). Furthermore, integrating care into justice reconfigures moral and political evaluation: it demands that social policies, legal frameworks, and institutional practices account for both material well-being and relational flourishing, reflecting a holistic vision of human dignity and equity (Fraser, 2019).

Integrating care and justice provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating ethical, social, and political arrangements. By centering relational responsibilities, context-sensitive judgment, and institutional support, this approach addresses the limitations of abstract justice models while offering a normative vision for democratic societies. Tronto's ethics of care demonstrates that

justice is inseparable from care: societies achieve fairness not only through equitable distribution of resources but also through the recognition, support, and integration of caring practices into public life. The synergy of care and justice thus offers a transformative lens through which moral philosophy, political theory, and public policy can be mutually informed to foster inclusive, equitable, and sustainable societies (Bellacasa, 2017).

Conclusion:

Joan Tronto's ethics of care challenges conventional conceptions of morality and politics by demonstrating that care is both ethically indispensable and politically constitutive. Across her work from *Moral Boundaries* to *Caring Democracy* and *Who Cares?* Tronto reconceptualizes ethical life as inherently relational, attentive to human vulnerability, and situated within concrete social contexts. Care, in this framework, is not an ancillary virtue but a moral obligation that shapes our responsibilities to others and underpins social cohesion (Held, 2017). By foregrounding the elements of care attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness, and solidarity Tronto highlights that human interdependence is morally significant and demands deliberate ethical reflection and action. Philosophically, Tronto's work expands the boundaries of ethical theory by situating morality within real-world relational networks rather than abstract principles alone. Care ethics exposes the limitations of deontological and utilitarian frameworks, which often neglect dependency, vulnerability, and the labor inherent in sustaining life (Tronto, 2015). By integrating relationality and responsiveness into ethical evaluation, care ethics illuminates how moral obligations are context-dependent, socially mediated, and intertwined with power structures, compelling philosophers to reconsider the nature of justice, obligation, and human dignity.

Politically, care is inseparable from justice. Tronto demonstrates that democratic legitimacy, civic participation, and social equity are contingent upon how care responsibilities are recognized, distributed, and institutionally supported. A society that neglects caregiving labor or marginalizes dependents fails to uphold substantive equality, as rights and freedoms are meaningless without the social conditions that enable their exercise. By reframing care as a public and political responsibility, Tronto challenges the private-public dichotomy, insisting that care is both a foundation of political life and a measure of justice. The philosophical significance of this integration lies in its reorientation of moral and political thought. Care ethics emphasizes relational responsibility, vulnerability, and interdependence as central to human flourishing, redefining justice as not merely procedural fairness but the creation of social conditions in which individuals can live dignified, participatory lives (Held, 2017). It highlights that ethical responsibility and political legitimacy are mutually reinforcing, and that both depend upon institutions, policies, and cultural practices that value, support, and sustain care.

Looking forward, the implications of Tronto's framework are profound. Integrating care into social institutions, public policy, and democratic practice is essential for ethical and sustainable societies, as it ensures that justice, equality, and human dignity are operationalized through relational, context-sensitive practices. It demands that philosophers, policymakers, and citizens recognize interdependence, embrace vulnerability as a moral reality, and design social structures that support relational responsibility. In this sense, care becomes a normative lens for both evaluating and shaping social and political life, offering a transformative vision in which ethical practice, political legitimacy, and democratic flourishing are inseparably linked. Tronto's ethics

of care provides a philosophically robust framework that integrates morality, justice, and politics. It compels a reconsideration of traditional ethical and political theories, foregrounds relationality and vulnerability, and offers actionable insights for designing societies that are equitable, responsive, and democratically legitimate. By positioning care at the core of human and institutional life, Tronto demonstrates that moral responsibility and political justice are not abstract ideals but relational practices that, when institutionalized, sustain both human dignity and the health of democratic societies.

References

- Baier, A. (1985). *Postures of the mind: Essays on mind and morals*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Collins, S. (2015). *The core of care ethics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dowling, E. (2021). *The care crisis: What caused it and how can we end it?* Verso Books.
- Eichner, M. (2015). *The supportive state: Government, dependency, and responsibility for caretaking*. In D. Engster & M. Hamington (Eds.), *Care ethics and political theory* (pp. 101–120). Oxford University Press.
- Engster, D. (2015). *Care ethics and political theory*. Oxford University Press.
- Fraser, N. (2019). *Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the “postsocialist” condition*. Routledge.
- Friedman, M. (2020). *Nursing ethics: Feminist perspectives*. Springer.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. Harvard University Press.
- Hamington, M. (2015). *Care ethics, political theory, and the future of feminism*. In D. Engster & M. Hamington (Eds.), *Care ethics and political theory* (pp. 293–311). Oxford University Press.
- Held, V. (2017). *The ethics of care: Personal, political, and global*. Oxford University Press.
- Kittay, E. F. (2015). *Love's labor: Essays on women, equality, and dependency*. Routledge.
- Mannering, H. (2020). A rapprochement between feminist ethics of care and contemporary theology. *Religions*, 11(4), 185.
- Nadasen, P. (2020). *Care: The highest stage of capitalism*. Verso Books.
- Noddings, N. (1984). *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education*. University of California Press.
- Pease, B., Vreugdenhil, A., & Stanford, S. (Eds.). (2018). *Critical ethics of care in social work: Transforming the politics and practices of caring*. Routledge.
- Puig de la Bellacasa, M. (2017). *Matters of care: Speculative ethics in more than human worlds*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Robinson, F. (2015). *A feminist practical ethics of care*. In R. Frodeman (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of international political theory* (pp. 500–518). Oxford University Press.
- Ruddick, S. (1989). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. Beacon Press.
- The Care Collective. (2020). *The care manifesto: The politics of interdependence*. Bloomsbury.
- Tronto, J. C. (1993). *Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care*. Routledge.
- Tronto, J. C. (2013). *Caring democracy: Markets, equality, and justice*. New York University Press.
- Tronto, J. C. (2015). *Who cares? How to reshape a democratic politics*. Cornell University Press.
- Urban, R., & Ward, C. (2020). Care and democratic citizenship: Ethical foundations of civic participation. *Ethics & Social Welfare*, 14(3), 276–292.
- Walker, M. U. (2007). *Moral understandings: A feminist study in ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Woodly, D., Brown, A., & Harris, T. (2021). Intersectional care and social justice in contemporary democracies. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 9(2), 203–221.